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During the 1950's and 1960's, not very surnrisinglv, investments in 
the agricultural sectors of most of the developing countries were made v~ 
increasing crop production, especlally the food grains. In SPite of these 
investments, agricultural growth remained painfullv slow, mainly becnu~e 
the local crop varieties had a lm·' genetic potential. Until recent! v, 
therefore, these countries had to import huge quant1ties of food grain~. 
In 1960, India, for example, imported 25.4% of t~e total wheat ~ra1ns a-
vailable in the country (production+ imports). This figure increased 
to 41% in 1964 and 43.3% in 1966. [10] In Brazil, domestic wheat produc-
tion accounted for only 4.25% of the total requirements in 1963-64. It 
increased to only 12.05% by 1966-67. [5] Turkey had to import 17.77, of 
its wheat requirement in 1961. nuring five years period of 195Q to 1963 
Turkey imported an average of 561,000 tons annually. By 1968, the imports 
were still about 500,000 tons, with a domest1c production of 8,400,000 
tons. [25] 
The importance of these imports becomes more pronounced when we exa-
mine their share in the distribution of food grains to the consumers. 
In India, for example, whereas imported wheat accounted for 43.3% of the 
total wheat grains available in the country in 1966, it represented 70 
percent of the wheat distribution to the consumers. [10] Thus, imports 
weighed very significantly in the distribution systems of these economies 
-2-
and a situation developed t..rhere (1) investment flowed mainly into the 
production programs, (2) domestic marketed surpluses being small, the in-
ternal marketing system remained neglected, and (3) marketing facilities 
development became heavily imports-oriented. As Brown puts it, 'over 
the past fifteen years, many large coastal cities in Asia, includjng 
Bombay, Calcutta, Djakarta and Karachi have been living from 'ship to 
mouth', depending on the wheat sent each year under the United States 
food-aid programs. For this reason, internal marketing systems designed 
to move food surpluses in these countries from the countryside to coastal 
cities or to other food deficit areas, have atrophied from disuse". [lJ 
With the introduction of new dwarf varieties of wheat and other im-
proved seeds such as hybrid corn and miracle rice (IR-8) etc., production 
of food grains and especially of wheat, increased substantially after the 
year 1967-68. Tndia 1 s wheat production increased by 80 percent betlveen 
1966-70 and complete self-sufficiency is in sight by 1972. Pakistan in-
creased its production of wheat by 60% between 1967 and 1969. The Philip-
pines, a traditional importer of rice has become rice-exporter. [1] 
Turkey became surplus in wheat to the tune of 448,000 metric tons in 1969. 
This surplus is estimated to increase to 1,440,000 tons in 1972 and 
1,870,000 tons by 1975. [25] Brazil decreased its dependence on imported 
wheats to less than 53% in 1970 and is expected to decrease it further 
to 40% in 1971 with domestic production increasing from 1.446 million 
metric tons in 1969 to 1.727 million tons in 1970 and 2.2 million tons in 
1971. [17] 
With this unprecedented increase in production, internal marketed 
surplus increased more than proportionately, because in the producing 
areas consumption needs of grains (which did not enter the market) t..rere 
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already satisfied and almost all of the additional production flowed to 
the market: 
y .. 
0 Co + Mo 
Yo + l:JY = Co + Ho + l:JY 
= co + M0 + l:JM 
.. Yo > 1-fo . 
l:JY l:JM 
.. Yo < Ho 
Y0 : base year production 
C0 : base year consumption by the producers including 
family, seed, contractual, animals and all other 
requirements, i.e. (Y0 - }~) 
Me= marketed surplus 
The magnitude of this increase in the marketed surolu~ is evident from a 
wheat market behavior study conducted in Pun1ab and Haryana States of 
India (Table 1). These are the two major wheat producing states in India.* 
Wheat production in Punjab increased bv 100.8 percent in 1970-71 over 
1966-67 production and market arrivals increased by 241.7 percent. Simi-
larly in Haryana state,production increased bv 99% and marketed surplus 
by 344.4 percent during this period. 
These increases in domestic marketed surpluses are unprecedented in 
quantities and the speed with which thev have occured within a short span 
of only 3-4 years. The market structure and facilities oriented mainly 
towards the handling of imports at coastal points and their shipment from 
*Of the 1970-71 Governaent Wheat Procurements in India, Punjab ac-
counted for 74.4%, aaryana 15.2 percent, and 10.4 percent rest of the 
Indian states. [11) 
Table-1 
Increases in Production and llarket Arrivals of H'heat 
in the Punjab and Haryana States of India, 1966-67 through 1969-70 
Year 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
___ _ Production 
~lillion Percent increase 
over over 
------
!1arketed Surpl_u.E_ ·- ___ _ 
Percent increase 
over over tons 1966-67 previous year 
~1i1lion 
tons 1966-67 previo~~-~~--
Punjab 
2.45 0.82 
3.34 36.3 36.3 1.64 100 100 
4.49 G3.3 34.4 2.32 182.9 41.5 
4.92 100.8 9.6 2.80 241.7 20.7 
Haryana 
1.06 - ... 0.18 
1.44 35.8 35.8 0.35 94.4 94.4 
5.5 0.45 150 28.6 
2.11 99.0 38.8 0.80 344.4 77.8 
----------
Source: Calculated from K.S. Gill, "Uheat 1-:l'arket Behaviour in Punjab and 
Haryana in Post Harvest Period 1968-69 to 1970-7111 , PAD, Ludhiana, 
(India), 1971. 
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ports to the consuming areas, became utterly inadequate and out-dated to 
handle these internal surpluses. In Hec;t Pakistan, for example, the 1969 
grain harvest was estimated at 14 million tons, of which 9 million tone; 
required storage facilities. Total storage capacity was onlv 5.5 million 
tons, resulting in a net deficiency of 3.5 million tons of grain storage 
facility. [24] In India, total storage capacity wac; estimated at 5.7 
million tons in the year 1967-68 and a large part of it was in the port 
areas which reflected the previous reliance on PL-480 imports. [23] In 
the Philippines, introduction of high yielding varieties created new 
problems in drying, processing and storage of grains. Commercial fac1li-
ties had been developed within the framework of a traditional svstem of 
marketing. A completely netv svstem 1'> now reouired for new varieties '3.nd 
increased surpluses. AID estimated tl1at in case of rtce alone, the Phili-
ppines will need .85 million tons additional storage c;pace to carrv a two 
month supply for the country. [22] 
Kenya changed position from a deficit to a surplus country in corn 
and will be an increasingly larger exporter of corn over the next decade. 
"The speed uith \vhich the Government solvec; the problem of handlinr c-oc;ts 
of corn from poi.nts of production to c;hi pside at ~lombasa will greatlv 
affect the volume of these exports." [10] In Turkey, the ~overnment hA.c; 
been buying enough wheat from the farmers to support prices 30 percent 
above> ~vorld level in 1969, hut it \vas "too earlv, hm.revE'r, to 1udge the 
ultimate success or failure of this marketing program in vieu of the 
small proportion of the total wheat production of Turkey ~vh:ich actuallv 
came from the HYV". At this stage, Turkev is in fact facing the same 
problems of inadequate and inappropriate markE't facilities as i~ heing 
faced in other developing countries. [25] Brazil, 8olumbia, Paraguay 
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and El Salvador in Latin America arP. reported to be experiencing tremen-
dous increases in wheat and corn production and are facing the problem 
of both traditional markets and market facilities not oriented toward~ 
serving the new increased internal marketed surpluses. [20] 
A country need not necessarily have to chan~e completely from the 
position of an importer to that of an exporter to ~ncounter the problems 
of marketing facilities lagging hehind; the mere occurrence of substantial 
increases in the domestic marketed surplug i~ often sufficient to thrm1 
the traditional marketing system out of gear. This is the aspect that 
remained ignored in the development effort~ of the LDC's. The agricul-
tural policy remained production-oriented and market research anJ develop-
ment did not receive the needed attention. No scientific criteria were 
developed to expand and develop marketing systems in these countries. As 
a result, congestions in the markets, delays and difficulties in storage 
and transportation, etc., occured in most of the producing areas in 
these countries. This led to some serious thinking in these economies 
on reorganizing and developing the market facilities. West Pakistan, for 
example, re~uested assistance from USAID in 1968 to determine means of 
increasing available grain storage. Th~ government of Pakistan arranged 
a Rs.l2.5 million loan from Canada under the Mondale amendment to PL-480 
in order to assist the financing of their crash grain storage construction 
program. [7] India launched upon a program of building extensive storage 
capacity, widening of the old market yards, constructing some new markets, 
regulating the old ones and streamlining the transportation system from 
the producing areas to the consuming areas. Brazil started building its 
rail and road transport to facilitate shipments of wheat from the producing 
regions of Southern Brazil to the seaports to move it on to the consuming 
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areas in the north. All such efforts again are being made without much 
of a scientific basis and criteria. 
Also, the governments in most of these countries adopted policies 
of int~rfering with the normal trade operations mainly through the instru-
ment of regulated prices. In some cases, governments entered the market 
to partially and sometimes completely replace the private trade. India 
introduced a system of support, procurement, and distribution prices* 
and the government entered the market as the biggest buyer and seller of 
food grains, especially of \vheat, rice and maize. India plans to build 
up buffer stocks of five million tons of food grain~ managed by the Food 
Corporation of India (a government body) by the year 1973-1974. [9] The 
government has many public agencies operating in the market such as food 
corporation of India (FCI), state food and civil supplies departments, 
cooperative supply and marketing federations, central warehousing corpor-
ations and state warehousing corporations, etc., which have reduced the 
private trade very considerably. The government of Kenya guaranties a 
minimum return to the growers for wheat and corn and establishes an incen-
tive price to the producer and often suffers losses to the treasurv on the 
export of corn. Government marketing organizations operate to receive 
corn from the producer and then export it. [21] The government of ~orocco 
through office cherifien interprofessionel des cereales (OCIC) controls 
the prices of bread wheat, wheat flour and seminola from the point of 
*Support price is the minimum guaranteed price announced by the go-
vernment prior to the sowing season in order to influence production de-
cisions of the farmers. Procurement orice is announced just prior to the 
marketing season. It is the price at which government pavs for the food 
grains it purchases. Distribution price is the price at which government 
sells food grains through flour mills, cooperatives, fair price shops and 
to the military, etc. 
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production or imports to the ultimate retail price. Other products under 
~overnment price control include rice, tobacco, ra'..r cotton, vegetable 
oils and sugar. Government controled market handling and distribution 
accounts for as much ao:~ 25 percent of the total cereal production in t"he 
country. [19] Pakistan has a svstem of floor (supnort) prices and pro-
curement, storage and government distribution. The government owns more 
than 25% of the total grain storage facilities in the country. [24] The 
Turkish government has a comprehensive price support systeM to aR<;ure 
stable producer prices on the one hand and adequate consumer sunnlies on 
the other. [25] Columbia has a price support nrogram for major crons. 
It purchases and allocates a large oroportion of donestic wheat and is 
responsible for all imports and their allocation. In Brazil, the govern-
ment controls the prices of important nroducts including corn, cotton, 
coffee, etc., to keep them in line with the needs. Xanv ~overnmentR have 
been operating substantial storage facilities too. [20] The Phi1inpines 
have a Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) with a responsibility to ~dmin­
ister farm and retail prices, buy, sell and import these food ~rains, and 
facilitate "nationalization" of grain marketing. [22] 
The governments in most of the LDC's have thus entered the agricul-
tural produce markets in three major ways: (1) controlling and adminis-
tering the prices, (2) developing and expanding the marketing facilities, 
and (3) taking the market operations partially but verv substantially 
into their own hands. All of this market intervention started due to the 
conditions of scarcity, is now continuing through the food grains self-
sufficiency stage and is likely to even expand as the internal marketed 
surpluses keep mounting. At this stap,e, it is worthwhile, therefore, to 
examine and develop some rational criteria and a framework for analysis 
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of these policies, particularly in the context of technological change 
and shifting relative prices. This paper is an attempt to suggest a 
framework for analyses of (1) the system of government controlled prices 
and (2) investments in the marketing facilities for these countries. The 
rationale for government controls and operation of markets are not dis-
cussed here. 
Analysis of Price Support 
Agricultural prices perform three main functions: (1) as an alloca-
tor of resources, {2) distributor of income and (3) as an influence on 
capital formation. [15] Historically, however, agricultural price poli(·v 
has been used negatively to keep the food and rm.;~ materials cheap for 
the growing industrial sector and to provide economic surpluses for in-
vestments in the industrial sector. A negative price administration of 
this type has been an important aspect of policy in the early phases of 
development in capitalistic as well as socialistic countries. [13] Only 
recently has it been recognized that a certain critical minimum rate of 
agricultural growth is a prerequisite for general growth of the economv. 
This critical minimum growth rate is, however, quite high for many devel-
oping economies, which underlines the reasons for a production-oriented 
positive price policy. A system of guaranteed prices for food grains and 
other important agricultural products is, therefore, followed in most of 
the LDC's. An FAO survev reported that in 1965, fifteen countries had 
adopted support prices for wheat, ten for barley, and sixteen each for 
maize and rice in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. [6] 
Although acceptance of a price support policy for agricultural products 
is very widespread, determination of the level of support prices remain~ 
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a baffling problem.* The level of these prices, in fact, depends on the 
objectives that are sought to be achieved through the instruments of 
price policy, which differ from country to country and time to time. In 
the developing e~~nomies, thP over-riding consideration iq to 8tPn up thP 
rate of growth of agricultural production. The support price policy has 
to be, therefore, production-oriented especially to assure the producers 
of the profitability of adopting new production technology which might 
be otherwise doubtful due to slumps in agricultural prices following 
good harvests. 
Various criteria can be used for determining the level of these 
prices**, such as cost of production, ruling price, and parity prices. 
All of them have their merits and demerits. Although heated discussions 
often take place on cost of production, it is generally accepted that the 
current co~t of production and even ruling price criterion can not be 
made the basis for determining the level of support or procurement prices. 
The parity price approach if modified and properly adjusted, has a good 
scope for determining a rational level of these prices. Various parities 
can be worked out, such as: (1) between prices of agricultural and non-
agricultural commodities, (2) between prices of individual agricultural 
*Here no attempt is made to examine the desirability of support 
prices or controlled prices. It is generally recognized that short of 
perfect market conditions, some ~ort of government interference in the 
price mechanism is essential especially in the situation of large number 
of small producers, not verv scrupulous trade, vagaries of nature and over 
all objectives of expanding the production of food grains and other agri-
cultural commodities. 
**Although support, procurement and distribution prices are always 
at different levels, no distinction is made in thi~ discussion, because 
here the emphasis is on methodology only. Once the level of one is de-
termined other prices can be derived easily. 
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commodities and general agriculturP 1 ~rices, (3) between prices received 
for farm products and paid for +arm inputc;, and (4) hetueen prices re-
ceived for farm products and paid for farm and familv expenditure items 
put together.* None of these levels based on different par1ties cnn h~ 
considered uniquelv approoriate. The various approaches provide a ran~e 
of prices within t11hich a paritv price should fall to remain within ;uc;ti-
fiable limits. An average of the different parity oricec; can give a 
starting point to the policv-maker for making his own adjustments. As 
an example, different estimates of parity prices for c;elected agricultural 
commodities in Punjab (India) for the vear 1969-70 are given in Tah1e 2. 
These estimates, however, have an element of a strong biac; due to 
the differences in the absolute base values for costs and returns. A 
given percentage change on a small base will not enuate with the same 
change on a large b~c;e. The input or cost prices normally have a smaller 
base compared to the output prices. The generally accepted computation 
of parity price is: ~ 
wP 
Wt+ 1 ; where C0 is the time series 
average price index of the commoditY, WP the average of the apnropriate 
price index with which parity is to be maintained, Cp the actual price 
t 
of the commoditv in the current vear and ~.,rt+ 1 thE' unit nrice index for 
the next year for which projection is Made. This neE'ds to be adiusted 
tdth "variable cost:gross returns" ratio. The deflated paritv index (Pd) 
will be: Pd • 100 + ~.y; where '~P' is the percentage point changE' in 
G 
the oriee index from the base period, 'V' is the variable costs, and 'G' 
*For a more detailed discussion of these methods, see Johl, George, 
and Singh. [13] 
Table-2 Different Estimates of Parity Prices for Selected 
Agricultural Commodities, Punjab (India): 1969-70 
Rupees~ Quintal 
Parity Parity Parity Parity Parity Average 
with with vlith with with of 
1952 ten-year adiusted prices prices parities 
fixed average base of inputs paid for 
base as base whole- (base inputs 
whole- whole- sale 1952-53) plus 
sale sale price consump-
price price index tion 
index index (base 
1952-53) 
\Jheat 82.93 76.82 82.34 91.27 81.51 83.07 
Gram 92.15 80.83 87.20 101.52 90.56 90.45 
Maize 69.01 60.91 65.68 76.02 67.80 67.88 
Bajra 62.79 69.46 74.44 69.38 61.69 67.55 
Rice (paddy) 58.73 48.37 52.22 64.70 57.70 56.34 
Barley 60.55 60.87 65.62 66.75 59.54 62.67 
Source: Reproduced from Johl, et.el. [13] 
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the gross returns per unit of output of the particular farm product.* 
The adjusted parity price can be then worked out as c 
Pt Pd.** 
This approach avoids the pitfalls of the unadjusted parity formulae. 
It takes account of the effects of technological improvements on per 
unit costs and returns and at the same time can take care of the relative 
price changes of agricultural products and of agricultural and non-agri-
cultural as well as input-output price levels in the economy. This ap-
preach has a built-in mechanism for adjusting the product prices to anY 
reduction in the unit cost of production as a result of technological 
innovations. In the developing economies where {1) continuous changes 
are taking place with respect to the use of improved production techno-
logy, (2) there exist producer-consumer conflicts of interests, (3) 
stability of prices is a crucial factor to avoid the damaging influences 
of inflation, (4) inter-sectoral flow of capital is important for the 
growth of the economy and (5) governments are riddled with the problems 
and responsibility of setting rational prices to achieve desired alloca-
tional and distributional goals, the adjusted parity price approach holds 
promise as a guide in determining reasonable levels of support prices. 
1'-!arketing Facilities Investment: 
The crucial market facilities, especially where the produce is phv-
sically exhibited before transactions in a market nlace, include (1) 
transport from the points of production to the priMary whole-sale market 
*The variable costs and gross returnc; can be taken for high vielding 
varieties at improved levels of production technologv because the major 
purpose and emphasis of support prices is to introduce and accelerate the 
pace of adoption of the new technology. 
**For an actual application of this formula, see Johl, et. el. [13] 
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place (for assemblin~) and from the nrimarv market to the secondary Yhole 
sale markets and consumption points, (2) storage at production point~ at 
the primary, secondarv, and terminal markets, (3) market yards with all 
the ancillary facilitt~s for shopping, rest and coPvenie~ce. (A) ;tna~ci~g 
institution~ and arrangements and (5) organizations to regulate and oper-
ate the markets in an orderly fashion. 
IYhen the trade is in the private hands, all these facilities tend 
to develop or recede in response to the marketed surpluses and changes 
in their flow patterns. Faciliti~s tend to be modest and are often lad-
ing in many respects but they remain more flexible to ad1ust to the chl'lng-
ing need. Yet, in the developing countries where a ma;oritv of the 
nroducer-sellers are small ~vi th very lm11 or no staving power, 1 t is oft en 
a buyer's markE't. The economically ~veak, small producer-sellers are 
often exuloited and many malpractices prevail. In India and Pakistan 
prior to the government regulation of markets, for example, a maun~, which 
was the most popular measure of weight, varied between 16 seers and 45 
seers with different weights for buying and selling. There were a multiple 
number of umvarranted deductions and the farmer-seller did not have anv 
say in, or even knowledge of, how the price of his produce was settled 
between his commission agent and the buyer. It is not very surprising, 
therefore, that the governments in these countries started regulating and 
controlling the markets. 
Since the private trade responded to the changing patterns and quan-
tities of market arrivals only passively and did not interact positively 
to stimulate production, the governments, having a very great stake in 
the production programs, endeavored to make the markets not only respon-
sive but attractive enough to provide meaningful incentives for higher 
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production. This led the public agencies to further regulate and control 
the markets and in most of the countries to enter the market, influence 
and dictate prices and develop institutional facilities for transport, 
storage and financing, etc. Much needed as they were, these facilities 
and the creation of organizations to regulate and handle the market oper-
ations involved huge investments. ~~oreover, these investments tended to 
be inflexible, especially when only current problems were considered i~ 
making these investments. The development of coastal facilities in many 
countries, discussed earlier, is a classic example of the inflexibility 
of investments made in market facilities in response to the immediate 
needs of these shortage economies. 
If public agencies have to play an increasing role in the marketing 
of agricultural products in the LDC's, it is to be recognized that as 
,more institutional facilities are developed, heavier and heavier invest-
ments will be involved. These investments will be much more inflexihle 
as compared to the private marketing facility investments.* It is, there-
fore, essential that marketing facility investments be made judiciously 
with a view not only to meet the challenge of the immediate needs and 
problems, but more so based on estimates of future changes in the product 
mix and flow of marketed surplus over space and time. Trade-offs in the 
economies in costs and degree of flexibility to cope with the changes in 
*Here no arguements are offered to justify or oppose the public take 
over of the market functions or interference with the market organization. 
It has its own merits and demerits and each country has to decide on 
whether or not public interference, control and take over is required; if 
so, to what extent and in what form depending upon its economic, socio-
cultural and political structure and objectives. This paper recognizes 
the fact of public participation, control and operations and proceeds on 
this basis. 
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the future deserve a careful -:::ons:!.c:erat:!.on in these planning models and 
designs. The following variables, t~2refore, need to go into the decision 
matrix for market facility investments: 
(1) Production estimates of different farm products for each vear 
over a fairly long period of 10-20 years. Quite a few programming models 
are already available and have been used on a pilot basis to obtain such 
production estimates in various countries. Particular mention is made 
here of the simulation model for the Nigerian economv developed at ~!ichi-
gan State University [12], the Day, Singh and '·!udahar recursive program-
ming model applied to the Punjab (India) agriculture [3, 18], the Duloy, 
Norton sectoral model on Mexico [4] and the Fletcher, Graber, ~errill 
and Thorbecke model for sectoral analysis of Guatemala agriculture f7, 
8].Even a much simpler but a comprehensive approach can be used as 
attempted by Cummings for India [2] and Johl and Kaul for Punjab. [14] 
(2) Production elasticities of marketed surpluses of various comma-
dities: 
E -~-sj b.P. 
J 
where 'Sj' stands for marketed surplus from 'P·' production of the 'j'th 
.1 
product. 
(3) Marketed surpluses of various products worked from estimates of 
(1) and (2): 
sj = s 1 + jt- E s. J 
S (t is time descript) 
1t-l 
(4) Import and export components: Mj and x1, over the whole period 
of planning. 
The point of importance here is that these estimates of annual magnitudes 
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of marketed surpluses as well as import and export estimates have to be 
made for a fairly long period to cover the lifetime of the major market 
facility investments. Also, these estimates have to be made with respect 
to time flow and patterns of arrivals and distribution. 
Total annual flows can be estimated as under: 
(a) 
(b) 
Internal flows : 
Terminal flows: 
sjt + Mjt 
Hjt + x.it 
In a deficit economy, import flows are important because they form a sig-
nificant portion of the marketed quantities. In a surplus economv, thev 
may not be so because only the quantities surplus of domestic needs may be 
exported. Anyway,coastal facility investments have to be done cautiously 
with respect to size and flexibility because they can be rendered surplus 
due to: (1) increases in domestic production, (2) spread of imports and 
exports over a longer period and (3) increasing inland facilities of 
storage, transport, etc. In this case peak needs can also be reduced bv 
judicious time-distribution of shipments. 
In the case of domestic surpluses, however, neak market arrivals 
cannot be so easily avoided; interior marketing facility investments, 
therefore, must be made keeping in vie"' peak arrivals. Here it is not a 
question of annual quantities, but of seasonal peaks. Flexibilitv in 
the quantum of a facility is more important here because otherwise either 
the capacity will run short of the requirements in crucial peak period(s) 
or it will remain unused in the slack season(s), thereby raising the 
overhead costs per unit of marketed surplus. Yet, there are certain fa-
cilities that cannot be made so flexible. Examples are permanent storage 
structures, rail tracks and market-yards. Net investment in such facili-
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ties during any time period (6It) Hill be governed not bv the average hut 
bv the highest volume of marketed surplus over the life period of the 
investment: 
n k 
~It=~ ( E E 6Sjt). 
j=l t=l 
Negative changes should be ignored; 6Sjt should he the net addition of 
marketed surplus of the jth commoditv in period 't' over the previous 
highest peak; 'i' would run from 1 ton crops and 't' from 1 to k qea~cng 
over the lifetime of the investment under consideration. Each season 
only the peak arrivals should be considered in order to satisfv the cri-
n 
terion of optimum point on investment, i.e. It = E Sit and a feasibility 
n j=l 
criterion of I > E s1t in phvsical term~. j=l 
There is always a scope of trade off between the facility inve~tment 
and incentives for more orderly and spread-out marketing of the nroduce. 
To the extent some incentives can be used, such as ~raduallv increasing 
procurement prices from harvest to the lean period in order to reduce the 
extreme peaks, they reduce the pressures on market facilities. As an 
example, Figure 1 and Table 3 indicate that over 85 nercent of the wheat 
arrivals in Punjab and Haryana states of India are received in the market 
in less than three months. \H thin this period onlv 10 to 15 days are 
most critical. If market faciliti~s do not match ~~ith the arrivals dur-
n 
ing this period, i.e., the feasibility criter1on I~ E Sis not met, 
j•l 
even one season's damage can be higher than the costs of additional faci-
lities needed. 
One of the main reasons why the producer-sellers rush their produce 
to the market is that they do not expect the urices to go high enough to 
match with their storage and withholding costs. [11] These peaks can be 
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Table-3 
Wheat arrivals in selected markets compared over post-harvest 
periods, Punjab, India, 1965-67 through 1970-71. 
Post Harvest Season 
Percent increase over 
Average Arrivals in qu1ntals Column No. 1 during 
for 3 
years 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1968-69 69-70 70-71 
1965-66 
to 1967-68 
---
Punjab 
Ludhiana 146912 270522 311490 315018 84 112 114 
Khanna 255834 615044 860757 783460 ]40 216 206 
Doraha 65597 164693 262361 260362 151 300 297 
Mu11anpur 51374 172812 290086 319191 23f) 46S 521 
Haryana 
Karna1 61696 161768 300044 431516 162 386 5<19 
Taraori 21034 62727 94759 139206 lq8 351 562 
Source: Gill, K. S. [11] 
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considerably reduced ~-Tith a more rational pricing policv. The criteria 
of facility investment should, therefore, be to meet the needs of abso-
lute peaks duly moderated with nrice and other nolicv instruments.* 
The same criteria can be used for coastal marketinR facilities. 
Here the volume of commodities has to be both imports as ~.,.ell aq cx,.,ortc;. 
There is much more opportunity for dovetailin~ the inflows and outflows 
on port handling and storage of commodities. Peaks can be more easily 
c;moothed out. Inland capacities are in fact a good trade off for some 
of the coastal market facilities. Inland storage, transport canacity and 
market organization can relieve much of pressures on coastal facilities. 
However, the opposite trade off is not as feasible. Coastal facility in-
vestments are much more, and sometimes severelv, circumscribed in their 
abilitv to relieve pressures on internal market facilities, especjally 
in the situation of suddenly increasing dome~tic marketed surpluses. 
These possibilities, therefore, should be carefully looked into before 
making additional investments on coastal market facilities. For cxamnlP, 
development of inland storage capacitie~ and efficient road transnort 
can be a considerably better alternative than development of huge storag0 
facilities at seaports and railway terminals. Coastal facility invest-
ments, once made, become irretrievahle; a change in domestic surpluses 
vis-a-vis import and export needs can render these facilities surplus, 
while serious bottlenecks may be occurring in the internal markets. This 
situation has been very markedly demonstrated in India, Pakistan, Brazil, 
Turkey and Philippines in the last 2-3 years. 
*It is therefore critical to know the response of the producer-seller 
to various price and other incentives with respect to the pattern of mar-
keting of their produce in order to determine the optimum marketing faci-
lity investment needs. 
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The criterion of any net facility investment in coastal market dur-
ing any time (~Ic ) should therefore be: 
t t n k n ( E E Hit + L: j=l t=l . j=l 
Here '~ 1 is the coefficient of facility requirements per unit commodity 
volume; Mjt and Xjt are the imports and exports of jth commoditv during 
period t; 'j' runs from 1 ton commodities and 't' runs from 1 to k sea-
sons in the life period of the facility. Period 't' can varv from a week 
to a season of any duration depending upon the oeriod of typical turn-over 
involved. ~indicates the trade-off coefficient between inland and 
coastal facility investments.* 
In conclusion, the agricultural production growth of most of the 
developing countries has been so impressive in the last 3-4 years tr1at 
it has very considerably decreased their dependence on imports espe~ially 
of food grains. Very likely some important food deficit countries will 
be becoming surplus in the near future. This shift from heavy dependence 
on imports to fast-increasing internal surpluses is changing the bundle 
of market problems. Government regulations, control and operations in 
the market need to be, therefore, more carefullv designed in view of the 
new situation and changing economic environment so that the domestic 
market becomes fully responsive to the production changes and at the same 
time keeps up the incentives for higher and better production. r.overn-
ment pricing of the agricultural products needs to be carefully structured 
*Coefficient 4> is the technical coefficients and can be easily 
determined by the agricultural engineers. Coefficient ~ is also a tech-
nical coefficient which can be determined by the engineers and economists 
jointly. 
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to reflect the general market demand and supplv conditions on the one 
side and not to be a disincentive to the nroducers' efforts on moderniza-
tion of production on the other hand. 1fhere public investment in market 
facilities becomes desirable, a rational criteria of balancing the capa-
cities with peak needs moderated with other policy elements, needs to he 
followed so that a reasonable allocation is made for coastal as t-1ell as 
internal market facility investments. Investment in more flexible faci-
lities may be more costly per unit of marketed commodity, vet, it needs 
to be weighed against the irretrievability costs of fixed investments 
under the constantly changing marketed quantities and the~r temporal as 
well as spatial flows and patterns. 
-20-
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